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Purpose / Motivation – Most empirical studies on the government expenditure-economic 
growth nexus suggests negative relationship between the size of the government expenditures 
and economic growth especially government consumption expenditures.  Given these findings, 
government should focus on development expenditures and reduce non-development 
expenditures for higher economic growth.  However, we argue that this may not be the case 
since government consumption expenditures along with better institutional quality promotes 
growth via reduced corruption, reduction of political risks and good governance. 
 
Design Methodology – This paper re-examines the impact of government expenditures on 
growth whilst controlling institutional factors for a sample of 30 developed and 91 developing 
countries from 1984 to 2017.  Government expenditure is segregated into consumption and 
development expenditures.   
 
Findings – Our results are consistent with existing findings where government consumption 
expenditures have negative effect on growth and government development expenditures 
contribute positively towards growth.  However, when we conditioned government 
consumption expenditures with institutional variables, results suggest that in the presence of 
good institutions, both government consumption and development expenditures promote 
growth. 
 
Practical implications – The findings in this paper suggest that in the presence of good 
institutions, government consumption expenditures will contribute positively towards growth.  
Results are relatively consistent for both developing and developed economies which suggests 
the importance of institutional factors leading to parallel movement towards long run growth 
path.  In other words, long run economic growth is driven by similar institutional environment. 
 
Originality / value –   Both developed and developing countries show similar reactions towards 
consumption and development expenditures.  This indicates that despite the level of 
development, government expenditures do contribute positively towards growth especially in 
the presence of better-quality institutions.  
 
Keywords: Government expenditures, institutions, economic growth, developing and 
developed countries 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The quest for sustainable economic growth and ‘catching up’ by developing countries 
requires unprecedented commitment from the government and scaling up government 
spending and policies.  The impact of government expenditures on economic growth 
has been intensively studied over the years with conflicting results.  Several unresolved 
issues on the impact of government expenditure on growth includes whether the impact 
of government expenditure is positive or negative, the source of government financing, 
the size of government expenditure, effectiveness of government expenditures and the 
type of government expenditure (Grier & Tullock, 1989; Barro, 1991; Li, 2009; 
Hansson and Henreksson, 1994; Feder, 1982; Facchini & Melki, 2013).  The majority 
of the empirical literature suggests that larger government size has negative impact on 
economic growth (Barro, 1991; Folstera & Henrekson, 2001; Angelopoulos & 
Philppopoulos, 2008; 2010; Alfonso & Furceri, 2010; Berg & Kaulsson, 2010; Wu et 
al., Butkiewicz & Yanikkaya, 2011; among others) due to various reasons such 
inefficiencies arising from higher tax burden or due to the crowding out effect as the 
public sector overshadows the private sector.  If this is the case, then governments 
should focus on development expenditures and reduce non-development expenditures 
to promote economic growth.  Armed with these empirical evidences, proponents of 
neoliberalism argued that the promotion of private sector initiatives coupled with 
reduction in the role of government expenditure is necessary to ensure efficiency, 
reduce crowding out effects and lessen the need for higher taxes to finance government 
expenditures hence, beneficial for long run economic growth.  However, this may not 
necessarily be the case. 
 
For developing countries, development activities are usually spearheaded by the 
government partly due to the risk averse nature of private investors.  Private and public 
expenditure may have different effects on the long run economic growth.  In addition, 
the presence of better institutional quality promotes economic growth because they 
foster trust and cooperation, encourage investment and deter free riding and rent 
seeking (Acemoglu et al, 2001, 2002; Hall & Jones, 1999).  On the other hand, poor 
institutions translate into corruption, inefficiencies, weak governance which later lead 
to economic stagnation and discourages investment. 
 
The nebulous impact of institutional quality on growth requires further investigation 
due to the complexity of the relationship.  From the theoretical perspective, a country’s 
territorial integrity, peacefulness emanating from lack of internal and external conflict, 
political stability, good governance and security are expected to provide a favourable 
ecosystem to accelerate economic growth and development.  Likewise, events of 
terrorism, domestic crime or outright civil conflict may have negative effect on 
economic growth.  Hausken et al.’s (2004) theoretical model shows government 
expenditures tend to reduce given an increase in democracy (when the system moves 
from pure autocracy to semi participatory system).  In the case where semi-participatory 
system moves towards full democracy, government expenditure tends to increase.  On 
the same note, Balamatisias (2018) showed that wealthier democracies increase 
government expenditure via better provision of public goods with taxes collected from 
the public. 
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Institutions proposed by North (1990) include both formal and informal norms as 
determinants on how people behave.  Good institution provides a conducive 
environment for growth and development as it fosters cooperation between private and 
public entities, ensures trusts which is vital in economic transactions, encourages more 
investment and compensates for free riding or rent seeking.  On the other hand, a 
country with poor institutions suggests proliferation of corruption, grafts, political 
instability which later translate into slower economic growth.  In developing countries, 
corruption may facilitate business activities and bypass bureaucracy, thus expediting 
business transactions.  From this perspective, corruption may have positive impact on 
economic growth. 
 
The need for empirical investigation to re-examine the effects of government spending 
on economic growth by controlling institutional norms stems from the arguments 
whether the size of government expenditure should increase or decrease given the level 
of economic development.  This study intends to show how institutions play an 
important role in ensuring prudent government expenditure and how this is achieved 
via effective institutions.  An absence of effective governance in public sector may 
adversely affect productivity of government expenditures and its intended objectives 
(Keefer and Knack, 2007).  In a weak and corrupt government, there would be a 
tendency to abuse government expenditures leading to unproductive activities and 
consumption.  On a different note, it is theoretically assumed that government 
development expenditure would promote growth via capital accumulation and 
provision of adequate, and necessary infrastructure.   Understanding this issue would 
lead to better policies for poverty eradication and accommodate the negative effects of 
income inequalities.  Empirical evidence has shown mixed results on how government 
consumption expenditures affect growth.  Whilst government development 
expenditures are shown to promote growth, the impact of government consumption 
expenditures on growth may be negative.  In this paper we argue that in the presence of 
good governance, even government consumption expenditures promote growth since it 
provides a conducive environment to promote greater stability and trusts for investors 
to invest in a country.    
 
This paper re-examines the empirical literature on how government expenditures affect 
growth by incorporating and conditioning on institutional variables in the analysis for 
the period 1984-2017.  We intend to examine whether the impact of government 
expenditures on economic growth is dependent on the value of institutional variables.  
Therefore, we introduced interaction terms where institutional variables are interacted 
with both government consumption and development expenditures.    Our study extends 
the work of Oto-Peralias and Romero-Avila (2013) and Nirola and Sahu (2019) by 
using a wider range of institutional variables. Empirical estimates include 30 developed 
economies and 91 developing economies using system GMM and fixed effect 
framework.  The focus of this paper is on the nature of the impact of government 
expenditures on growth rather than the size of government expenditures.  We segregate 
government expenditures into consumption expenditures and development 
expenditures.  The sample is split into developed and developing countries.  Results 
suggest that consumption expenditures have negative effect on economic growth whilst 
development expenditures promote growth which is consistent with existing literature.  
When government expenditures are conditioned upon institutional variables, the impact 
government consumption expenditures on economic growth becomes positive.  In the 
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case of government development expenditures, the positive relationship continues in 
all specifications.  Our results are robust to various specifications of institutions. 
 
The paper is structured as follows.  The next section overviews the relevant literature.  
Section 3 delve on the empirical methodology and discussion on the data.  Section 4 
discusses the findings and the final section concludes.   
 
 
2. GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
The endogenous growth model (Romer 1986; Lucas, 1988) has been exhaustively used 
to examine the interaction of government expenditures, investment, human capital and 
institutions to drive economic growth.  In other words, the endogenous growth theory 
posits that growth rate is largely determined by factors within the production processes 
such as increasing returns, economies of scale, technological changes and other internal 
factors rather than external factors such as population growth.  Unlike the traditional 
Solow growth model which rely traditional labour and capital accumulation, the 
endogenous growth model offers explanation economic growth in the long run where 
savings and investment lead to persistent growth via endogenous technological 
improvements generated via day to day economic activities.  The original work by 
Wagner (1883) (Barro, 1990) argue that government expenditures increase over time 
as it complements existing factor inputs.  For example, public expenditure on health 
tend to lower mortality rates, education leads to more skilled workforce and increase 
productivity, expenditure on law and order allow businesses to operate in a peaceful 
and stable environment; all of which promotes expansion of the economy through 
economic growth.  More specific theoretical work by Barro (1990) and later Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1992) illustrates the importance of government expenditures in the form 
of government purchases of goods and services in accelerating economic growth.  
Government expenditure addresses market failures which could hamper economic 
growth (Kahn, 2007; Stiglitz, 1989; Hansson and Henrekson, 1994; Sanz & Velazquez, 
2007; Galasso & Profeta, 2004; Disney, 2007; among others).  Market failures in the 
form of natural monopolies which leads to inadequate provision of public goods can be 
regulated by the government.  Government expenditure on public goods is a form of 
government intervention to correct market failures and other negative externalities 
which could hinder economic growth and development (Kahn 2007; Stiglitz, 1989).  
Government expenditures further promote economic growth and development by 
injecting funds into the economy to create more jobs which later translate into higher 
income and higher GDP, leading to economic growth.  Via job creation and potentially 
earning higher income, government expenditure indirectly remedies social inequalities 
and reduce poverty.  With more income, the lower income household may realize their 
full potential, skills and talent to provide the much-needed human capital for economic 
development as envisioned by the endogenous growth model.  Specifically, productive 
government expenditures on health and education can greatly reduce costs of social 
inequality (Sylwester, 2002; Birdsall et al., 1995) as educated and healthy society 
promotes greater innovations which is one of the important components for sustained 
economic growth.  However, as population ages, government expenditure on health 
services and welfare expenses would also increase (Sanz & Velazquez, 2007; Galasso 
& Profeta, 2004; Disney, 2007). 
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The theoretical relationship between government expenditure and growth could be 
described based on Armey’s (1995) curve.  The theory proposed an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between the size of government vis-à-vis economic growth.  The Armey 
curve posits a positive relationship between government spending and economic 
growth below a certain threshold whereas above this threshold, government 
expenditure is expected to generate negative effects.  Empirical findings differ in 
accordance to the choice of estimation method adopted in the study.  Linear models 
(Bergh and Henrekson, 2011) tend to generate either negative or positive effects.  Non-
linear models on the other hand, suggest a certain optimal government size or threshold 
exists which captures the turning point from positive to negative impact of government 
expenditure on growth (Asimakopoulous and Karavias, 2016; DiPeitro Anoruo, 2012; 
among others). 
 
More recent empirical studies have focused on the size of government expenditure as 
one of the measures of inclusive growth (Bergh and Henrekson, 2011; Asimakopoulas 
and Karavias, 2016; Whajah, 2019; Zhour et al., 2019) which not only accounts for 
increase in GDP but also looks at the welfare of individuals and societal well-being as 
an attempt to achieve United Nation’s sustainable development goals (SDGs).  Ogbu 
(2012) suggested a good macroeconomic policy formulation such as directing industrial 
policies targeted at improving manufacturing and agricultural sector and investment in 
infrastructure, coupled with government expenditures warrant inclusive growth. 
 
The empirical results on how government expenditure varies with the sample size, 
countries included in the sample, estimation method used and duration of the study.  In 
the 1980s and 1990s, most studies rely on OLS estimation method.  Examples includes 
Landau (1983) who studied 96 developing countries, Engen & Skinner (1992) with 107 
countries, Hansson & Henrekson (1994) with 14 OECD countries and 14 developed 
countries, Folster & Henrekson (2001) with 23 OECD countries and Knowles & 
Garces-Ozanne (2003) for Asian countries (1960-1985) found negative relationship 
between economic growth and government spending.  On the other hand, Kormendi & 
Meguire (1986) studied 47 countries, Ram (1986) with 115 countries, Lin (1994) with 
20 developed countries and 42 developing countries showed positive impact of 
government spending on economic growth.  Gwartney et al. (1998) concluded a 
negative impact of government spending on growth using statistical inference based on 
23 OECD countries and 5 rapidly developing countries.  Based on VAR, Hsieh & Lai 
(1994) suggested no meaningful relationship between economic growth and 
government spending for G7 countries covering a sample period from 1970-1987.  In 
contrary, Javid et al. (2009), found negative relationship for Pakistan for a sample 
period of 1971-2008 using VAR.  Dar & Amir Khalkhali (2002) relied on random 
coefficient model to test the relationship and found a significant negative relationship 
for a sample of 19 OECD countries.  In general, earlier literature suggests positive 
relationship exist for developing countries and negative or no impact for developed 
countries. 
 
More recent studies use more sophisticated method to remedy the weaknesses of OLS.  
One of the most widely used method is the panel data estimation technique (Afonso & 
Furceri, 2010; Butkiewwicz & Yanikkaya, 2011; Agnello et al., 2013, Granado et al., 
2013; among others).  Afonso & Furceri (2010) studied 29 OECD countries and 15 EU 
countries from 1970-2004 found negative relationship.  Similar results were inferred by 
Butkiewwicz & Yanikkaya (2011) with both developed and developing countries in 
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their sample from 1970-2004.  Agnello et al. (2013 found positive relationship for 132 
countries between 1960-2008 whilst Ravn et. Al. (2012) investigated four developed 
countries – UK, US, Canada and Australia and found positive relationship using panel 
SVAR.  On contrary, Granado et al. (2012) suggest a procyclical relationship based on 
their findings for 150 countries from 1987-2007.  A single country example by Hamdi 
& Sbia (2013) suggested a positive relationship using VECM for Bahrain.  On a 
different note, Dzhumashev (2014) calibrated Kenya, Turkey and UK to capture low, 
middle and high income respectively and found negative relationship due to corruption.  
The ambiguity of the effect of government expenditures on economic growth is partly 
remedied by using inclusive growth as an alternative measurement for growth. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA SOURCES 
 
Model Identification 
 
The empirical framework is based on a synthesis of the models developed by Devrajan 
et al. (1996), Mittnik and Neumann (2003) and d’Agostino et al. (2011), which is 
structured around Barro’s (1990) endogenous growth model. This approach allows for 
non-monotonic relationship between government spending and growth in the 
theoretical framework.  Accordingly, the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
function is defined as follows: 
 
𝑦 = [𝛼𝑘− +  𝛽𝐺−]
−
1
  ;               𝛼 +  𝛽 = 1   and    𝜗 ≥ 1   (1)
  
where y is a function of private capital stock, k, and government spending, G.  G is 
assumed to be a non-perfect substitute for private input.  The private input must satisfy 
the following condition: 
?̇? = (1 −  𝜏)[ 𝛼𝑘− +  𝛽𝐺−]
−
1
 − 𝑐              (2)      
where ?̇? captures growth of private input over time, 𝜏 denotes the rate of income tax 
and c is the consumption level of households. A rational representative agent maximizes 
lifetime utility, U, by choosing consumption level, 𝑐𝑡 for period t.   
 
Let  represent the discount rate and the assumption of an isoelastic utility function 
given by:  
𝑢(𝑐𝑡) =  
(𝑐1−−1)
(1− 𝜎)
            (3) 
where   is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption.  
 
Therefore, the representative agent maximizes the following utility function: 
𝑈 =  ∫ 𝑢 (𝑐𝑡)𝑒
−𝜌𝑡. 𝑑𝑡
∞
0
         (4) 
 
The flat rate income tax is defined as follows: 
𝜏 =  
𝐺
𝑦
            (5) 
 
The above equation can also be interpreted as the share of public spending on output or 
the size government in the economy.   
 
To examine the impact of G on economic growth, let: 
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𝛾 =  
𝑐̇
𝑐
=  
1
𝜎
[(1 −  𝜏)𝑦′] −          (6) 
 
where 𝑦′ is the marginal product of private capital.  d’Agostino et al. (2011) solved the 
model by substituting equation (3) into equation (4) and maximizing subject to equation 
(2) which yields: 
𝛾 =  
𝑐̇
𝑐
=  
1
𝜎
[(1 −  𝜏)𝛼
−
1
] [
(1−𝜏𝛽
−
1
)(1+ )+ 𝛽
−
1+ 
𝜏
+
(1−𝜏𝛽
−
1
)(1+ )
] −  𝜌     (7) 
 
Equation (7) is the standard endogenous growth model, where 𝛾 is a linear function of 
𝜏 and the parameter for government spending is represented by 𝛽.   
 
The optimal level of government spending as a proportion of GDP is where 𝜏 is equal 
to the marginal effect of 𝜏. In this paper, government expenditure is categorized into 
government consumption expenditure (𝑔1) and government investment expenditure 
(𝑔2) as defined in the following equation: 
𝐺 =  𝑔1 + 𝑔2 =  𝜏𝑦                             (8)
        
The share of government spending on both 𝑔1 and 𝑔2 are captured by 𝜑 and ( 1 −  𝜑) 
respectively as in equations (9) and (10): 
𝑔1 =  𝜑𝜏𝑦            (9) 
𝑔2 = ( 1 −  𝜑)𝜏𝑦                         (10) 
 
Expressing equations (9) and (10) in the production function yields: 
𝑦 = [𝛼𝑘− +  𝛽𝑔1
−
+  𝛿𝑔2
−
]
−
1
                 (11) 
 
Let, 
𝑔
𝑘
= {[𝜏 −  𝛽𝜑− −  𝛾 (1 −  𝜑)−]/ 𝛼}
1
                  (12) 
and  captures the steady state growth rate of consumption, then, 
 =  
𝛼 (1− 𝜏){𝛼𝜏/[𝜏− 𝛽𝜑−− 𝛾 (1− 𝜑)−]}
−
1+
 − 𝜌
𝜎
                  (13) 
From equation (12), the relationship between growth rate and government spending, 
𝑔1, is expressed as: 
𝜕
𝜕𝜑
=  
𝛼 (1− 𝜏)(1+ )[𝛼𝜏]
−
1+
  [ 𝛽𝜑−(1+)− 𝛾 (1− 𝜑)−(1+)]
𝜎[𝜏− 𝛽𝜑−− 𝛾 (1− 𝜑)−]
−
1

                (14) 
 
If  is positive, then, 
(1 + ) [𝛽𝜑−(1+) −  𝛾 (1 −  𝜑)−(1+)]  > 0         (15) 
 
𝑔1 is productive if, 
𝜕
𝜕𝜑
 > 0 
 
The same assumptions apply to 𝑔2.   
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Based on this setting, the estimation equation is based on the endogenous growth model 
following the special Cobb-Douglas production function: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝛼  𝐺𝑖𝑡
𝛽
 (𝐴𝑖𝑡𝐿𝑖𝑡)
1−𝛼−𝛽 ,   0 < 𝛼 < 1,    0 < 𝛽 < 1 ,   0 < 𝛼 + 𝛽 < 1              (16) 
 
Y if the production of final good, G captures government expenditure which is 
segregated into government consumption expenditure and development expenditure 
and K is the capital stock.  Afonso and Jalles (2016) suggest that A is the level of 
technology and is assumed to grow at an exogenous constant rate µ such that, 
 
𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝐴𝑖0𝑒
𝜇𝑖𝑡+𝐼𝑖𝑡𝜌𝑖                    (17) 
 
with I denoting institutional quality that may affect the level of technology and 
efficiency in country i at time t.  Equation (16) shows that the state of A depends not 
only on technological improvements determined by µ, but also the level of institutional 
quality.  Based on the arguments purported by North (1990), the existence of an 
efficient and effective institutions warrants effective use of labour and other resources.  
In this case, effective institutions may accelerate a country’s technological 
breakthroughs vis-à-vis another without an effective institution. 
 
Taking logs on both sides of equation (16), 
ln 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝐴0 + (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)𝜇𝑖𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)𝜌𝑖𝐼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼 ln 𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽 ln 𝑔𝑖𝑡             (18) 
 
which implies growth is a function of institutional related variables which may change 
over time, government expenditure, physical capital and the level of output. 
 
Empirical Strategy 
 
In this paper, we estimate the dynamic interaction between economic growth, 
government expenditures and other control variables using two step GMM estimator 
for an unbalanced panel of 91 developing countries and 30 developed countries over 
the period 1984-2017.  Observations are averaged over 5-year interval which is a fairly 
common practice (inter alia Flachaire et al., 2014; Nawaz, 2015), yielding at least six 
data points per country and totalling approximately 546 observations for developing 
countries and 180 observations for developed countries.  Averaging is used to smooth 
out business cycle fluctuations.   System GMM offers several advantages compared to 
its predecessors comprising of pool OLS, fixed and random effect model, difference 
GMM.  These advantages include control for time-invariant country specific effects, 
deals with endogeneity problem of lagged dependent variables, assuage reverse 
causality, permits certain degree of endogeneity in other regressors and optimally 
combine information on cross-country variations in levels with that on within-country 
variation in changes (Fukase, 2010).   
 
We estimate the following growth model, 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝑖𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝜃𝑖𝑡𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 +  𝜌𝑖𝑡𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 +  𝑖𝑡          (19) 
 
 
where i indicates the country (i= 1, … , N) and t indicates the time period ( t = 1…, T)  
𝑌𝑖𝑡  captures the growth rate of country i at the end of period t,   𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of other 
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control variables hypothesized to affect output growth, 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡  represent government 
expenditures, 𝛼 , 𝛽 , 𝜃  and 𝜌  are the parameters and vectors of parameters to be 
estimated, 𝑣𝑖 are country-specific effects, 𝜇𝑡 are period specific effects and, 𝑖𝑡 is the 
error term.  The control variables include the initial income (Initial GDP), population 
growth (population) and investment (investment).    
 
Due to problems in pooled, fixed and random effect panel models, Arellano and Bond 
(1991) suggest the use difference GMM where the first differences of all variables are 
used to eliminate the fixed effects.   Equation (1) is transformed into first difference 
and re-written as follows: 
 
∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖∆𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝑖∆𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝑡∆𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 +  𝜌𝑖𝑡∆𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  ∆𝑣𝑖 + ∆𝜇𝑡 +  ∆ 𝑖𝑡
           
                (20) 
 
In equation (20), we follow Arellano and Bond (1991) by using appropriate lags of 
dependent and independent variables as instruments to over the problem of correlation 
between the lagged dependent variable and eh error term.  Other problems emanating 
from lagged levels of regressors include weak instruments, first difference GMM 
estimator behave poorly, leading to large sample biases, absence of information on 
focus variables in level form leads to loss of substantial part of total variance in the data 
and weak instruments cannot address differenced variables in a difference estimator 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998).  To assuage this problem Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) suggested the use of system GMM estimator which combines 
first difference and level variables.  To calculate the system estimator, differenced 
variables are instrumented with lags of their own levels, and variables at levels are 
instrumented with lags of their own difference (Bond et al., 2009).  Therefore, 
explanatory variables may be correlated with a country’s specific fixed effect but their 
differences are not correlated which makes system GMM more asymptotically efficient 
in estimation.  Roodman (2009) also proposes the use of system GMM instead of 
difference GMM for unbalanced panel data since different GMM tends to magnify 
gaps.  We employed Windmeijer (2005) correction to reduce standard errors which tend 
to be downward biased (Roodman, 2009).  Finally, we contain the problem of over-
identifying instruments by ‘collapsing’ or forcing the use of only certain lags instead of 
all available lags (Viera et al., 2013; Roodman, 2009).  Hansen J-test is used to test for 
over-identifying restrictions after applying Windmeijer correction.  The standard 
Arellano and Bond (1991) AR(2) test for no autocorrelation in the second differenced 
error is used to test for serial correlation. 
 
Another argument is the lack of efficiency for small samples when using GMM.  In our 
case, the sample of developed countries is only 30.  Although there has been studies 
which uses system GMM for small samples (see for example Nawaz, 2015), we 
supplement the results using fixed effects panel estimations in Appendix B.  
 
Data Sources 
 
The sample of countries are divided into developed and developing countries with 
reference to World Economic Situation and Prospects (WESP), United Nation (2018).  
The separation between developed and developing economies stems from the idea that 
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countries are on different growth phases hence, aggregation may undermine certain 
important information.  In its original form, WESP classifies all countries into three 
broad categories – developed economies, economies in transitions and developing 
economies.  Since the number of countries under economies in transition is small, we 
combine them with the developing economies.  The sample of developed and 
developing countries are listed in table 1.  The choice of countries in our sample is 
mainly dictated by data availability for most variables. 
 
 
Table 1: List of selected developed and developing countries 
 
Definition Countries 
Developing 
countries 
 
(91 
countries) 
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Bahamas,  Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, central 
African Republic, Chad, China, Chile, Colombia, Congo (DR), Congo 
(Rep), Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, 
Guinea, Guinea- Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Korea 
(north), Lao, Lebanon, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, 
Mexico,  Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Sudan, Sri Lanka, South Korea, 
Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, 
Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, UAE, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
 
Developed 
countries 
 
(30 
countries) 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, United States, Australia, New 
Zealand, Switzerland 
 
EU-13: 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania  
 
Note: The classification is based on World Economic Situation and Prospects, (WESP), United Nation 
(2018).  WESP classifies all countries into three broad categories – developed economies, economies in 
transitions and developing economies.  Since the number of countries under economies in transition is 
small, we combine include them under the developing countries. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the data used in the empirical regression.  Growth rates are proxied 
by GDP growth rates from World Development Indicator (WDI).  Alternative proxies 
such as GDP growth from IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) are also used 
to test for sensitivity of the estimates.  The signs are similar but size of the coefficient 
varies.  Human capital is proxied by population growth.  Other proxies such as the 
number of schooling years, labour from the age of 15 to 64 from WDI and population 
growth data from Bolt and Zanden (2014), The Madison Project are used as alternatives.   
Results using the alternative specification are similar in sign and significance, therefore 
we only report the results based on population growth by WDI.  Capital is proxied using 
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investment data from Penn World Table 9.1.  Investment as a proxy for capital stock is 
used by Flachaire et al. (2014).  Institutional variables are proxied using data from 
ICRG, PRS which consist of twelve (12) sub-variables to capture different institutional 
norms in each country.  Data has been re-index to ensure consistency and comparability 
in interpretation.  For robustness test, we employ an alternative measure of institutions 
using the data from World Governance Index (WGI) which consists of six (6) sub-
variables.  These two sources of data may not be identical in description and 
interpretation but is adequate to illustrate the importance of institutional variables on 
economic growth.   
 
TABLE 2. Definition and source of data 
Acronym Definition Source Expected 
sign 
g GDP growth rate WDI  
Gov_cons Government consumption expenditure /GDP WDI +/- 
Gdpt-1 Lag of growth rate of GDP WDI +/- 
Gov_dev Government development expenditures/GDP WDI +/- 
Initial_Y Initial income proxied by log of GDP of previous 
period 
PWT8.0 +/- 
Investment Log of investment PWT9.1 +/- 
Population 
growth 
Population growth proxied by annual change in 
population 
WDI +/- 
Institutional 
variables 
Institutional variables from ICRG (12 variables): 
1. government stability  
2. socio economic conditions  
3. investment profile  
4. internal conflict  
5. external conflict  
6. corruption  
7. military in politics  
8. religious tensions  
9. law and order  
10. ethnic tensions  
11. democratic accountability  
12. bureaucracy  
 
ICRG, 
PRS 
+/- 
Institutional 
variables 
Institutional variables from World Governance 
Index (WGI), World Bank 
1. voice and accountability 
2. political stability and absence of violence 
3. government effectiveness 
4. regulatory quality 
5. rule of law 
6. control of corruption 
WB +/- 
Notes: WDI denotes World Development Indicator, World Bank; PWT denotes Penn World Table and ICRG, PRS 
denotes International Country Risk Guide, Political Risk Group. Brief explanation of the institutional variables is 
available in the Appendix A. 
 
 
The corruption index by ICRG, PRS defines corruption involvement in illegal activities 
whether actual or potential form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, 
‘favour-for-favour’, secret party funding or close ties between political leaders and 
businesses (Political Risk Survey Group, 2014).  WGI has a broader coverage of 
corruption.  WGI define control of corruption based on several indicators that measures 
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how public power is exercised for private gain such as institutional corruption by elitists 
with private interest, additional payments to get things done, among others.  Kaufmann 
et al. (2009) used at least 23 sources to form the index and one of the sources include 
ICRG, PRS. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Initial GDP is positive and significant in all cases for developing economies and 
developed economies.  Results are fairly consistent across all samples.  Trade openness 
is positive and significant for developing economies in all cases.  Investment is 
expected to increase as countries began to develop better institutions, promote greater 
transparency and ultimately, increasing their return on investments.  For developed 
economies, investment is positive and significant in government consumption 
expenditure regressions and also significant under government development 
expenditure regressions.  These results suggest the importance of capital investment for 
growth in developed economies and developing economies.  The impact of population 
on growth is generally insignificant for both developed and developing economies.  A 
few macroeconomic-based studies found insignificant or negative significant 
relationship between human capital and economic growth (Benhabib and Spiegal, 
1994; Pritchett, 2001; among others).  Results are fairly consistent with our theoretical 
model (Equation 16 and 17). 
 
We regress the 12 institutional indicators separately to examine the impact of each 
variables individually.  Although it may seem that the variables may be related to each 
other, for example, law and order may be correlated with government stability and 
absence of internal conflict, the statistically strong correlation amongst the variables is 
not present (refer to Appendix C).   In general, all 12 institutional indicators are 
expected to be positively related to growth, since less political risk and better 
institutions are expected to promote growth.  Strong institutions are expected to reduce 
information asymmetries since they channel information about market conditions, 
market participants, and goods and services, hence expediting business transactions, 
which later translates into growth. 
 
The results show government consumption expenditures tend to lower economic 
growth but government development expenditure promotes growth in long run for both 
developed and developing economies.  The institutional variables affect growth in 
several ways.  In the case of developing economies (Table 3), more stable government, 
reduced internal and external conflict, better socio-economic environment and better 
democratic accountability are precursors to growth.  In developing economies, it may 
be case that corruption expedites business and trade processes especially when dealing 
with government agencies. On the other hand, lower corruption, less military 
intervention, less ethnic tension, less intervention of religion in politics and lower 
investment risks do not necessarily lead to higher growth under the government 
consumption expenditures regressions.  Table 4 shows improvements in government 
stability promotes growth in the government development expenditure regressions.  
Lower military conflict, lower ethnic tension, better bureaucratic quality, lower 
investment risks and lower religion in politics do not lead to higher growth. 
 
For developed economies, lower corruption, less internal conflict, better socioeconomic 
conditions and quality government are precursors to growth.  Better bureaucratic 
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quality and lower investment risks, on the other hand, do not lead to higher growth.  In 
an economy where, strong contract enforcement and regulations governing transactions 
is in place, businesses are expected to run smoothly and bribery or any form of 
corruption is minimized (Baliamoune-Lutz & Mavrotas, 2009; Morris and Klesner, 
2010). In other words, corruption acts as an indicator for the prevailing level of 
(mis)trust.  Results are illustrated in Table 5.  Development expenditure has a positive 
impact on growth for developed economies as illustrated in Table 6.  Institutional 
factors such as government stability, lower internal and external conflict and less 
religious factors in politics further support growth.  Investment profile remain negative 
which imply lower risks do not necessarily lead to higher growth. 
 
The validity of the instruments for the two-step system GMM estimator is substantiated 
by Hansen test.  We apply Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions and results no 
reason to reject the validity of the instruments.  There is also no evidence of second 
order serial correlation. 
 
Robustness test 
 
We rely on six (6) institutional indicator by World Bank Governance Index which 
include voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption.  
Although the indicators are not directly similar to the institutional variables discussed 
above, they provide similar intention to capture the institutional setup of a country.  
Generally, results show convergence between developed and developing economies 
where consumption expenditure leads to lower growth whilst development expenditure 
may stimulate growth.  These findings are consistent even when different institutional 
variables are used. 
 
For developing economies, voice and accountability, political stability and rule of law 
advocate growth even when consumption expenditure slower growth (Table 7).  When 
development expenditure is used, political stability encourages growth but government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law do not generate positive influences on 
growth (Table 8). 
 
In the case for developed economies, government effectiveness has positive impact on 
growth, but regulatory quality may not produce the same positive effect on growth 
when consumption expenditure is used (Table 9).  Table 10 shows development 
expenditure promoting growth along with positive impact of voice and accountability 
and political stability.   
 
Interaction effect between institutions and government consumption expenditure 
 
To further understand the quandary between economic growth, government 
expenditures and institution, we introduce the interaction term.  The interaction term 
between government consumption expenditures and institutional variables shows some 
divergence from the benchmark regressions, as presented in Table 11 and 12.  Whilst 
initial income, population growth and investment show the same behaviour as the 
benchmark regressions in Table 3 and 5, government consumption expenditures is now 
positive and the interaction term between government consumption expenditures and 
institutional variables are also positive.  In the case of developing economies, the 
interaction between government consumption expenditures with corruption, democratic 
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accountability, military in politics, government stability, investment profile and quality 
of government are positive and significant.  The results suggest lower corruption, good 
governance and little military intervention in economic decision would spur economic 
growth.   
 
For developed economies, government stability, lower internal and external conflict, 
better investment profile and better quality of government, when interacted with 
government consumption expenditures yield positive and significant impact.  This 
shows that in the presence of good institutions, government consumption spending is 
efficiently used, resulting in a positive impact on the economy in general.  Furthermore, 
population is insignificant which can be due to the fact that labour has been extensively 
replaced by mechanization in these countries. 
 
In summary, the findings so far demonstrate that government consumption 
expenditures affect growth in a negative manner, since consumption expenditures is 
normally channelled to unproductive usage. Examples include expenditure on welfare, 
subsidies, and other forms of aid. Conversely, government investment expenditures is 
channelled into productive activities such as infrastructure, roads, telecommunications, 
or bridges, which brings in more investment and expedites the production process and 
increases productivity, resulting in economic growth. As such, government investment 
expenditures positively affect growth. It is important to note that our empirical results 
are uniform in both benchmark regressions and in the robustness tests for both 
developed and developing countries.  These findings are consistent with Feng (1997), 
Gradstein (2004) and, Kurtz and Schrank (2007), although the proxies for institutions 
differ. 
 
In general, results show that institutional variables affect growth. Specifically, for 
developing economies all institutional variables except investment profile and quality 
of government have significant impact on growth in regressions with government 
consumption expenditures.  Regressions with government development expenditures 
suggest the statistical importance of internal conflict, government stability, investment 
profit and socio-economic conditions.  For the developed and politically mature 
economies, democratic accountability, bureaucratic quality, investment profiles and 
socio-economic conditions are significant factors for economic growth when 
government consumption expenditures are used.  On a similar note, military in politics, 
government stability, internal and external conflict, socio economic conditions, religion 
in politics and quality of government are significant factors along with government 
development expenditures.  Furthermore, the negative impact of government 
consumption expenditure diminishes when government consumption expenditures are 
interacted with the institutional variables.    
 
In the case of interaction variables for the developed countries, the interaction between 
government expenditures and government stability, socioeconomic conditions, 
corruption, law and order, and external and internal conflict are almost consistently 
significant in the long run across all regressions. On the contrary, the impact of the 
interaction term almost diminishes with the introduction of other control variables.  For 
this reason, results for developing countries should be interpreted with care.  Therefore, 
government expenditures are necessary for economic development for both developed 
and developing countries.  Policies should be geared toward development expenditures 
to enhance economic growth.  
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TABLE 3.  
Two step system GMM (vce robust) estimation using government consumption expenditures (g_cons) for developing economies 
Dependent variable: growth (gdpg) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Gdpgt-1 -0.8499*** 
(0.0377) 
-0.8639*** 
(0.0407) 
-0.8678*** 
(0.0399) 
-0.8523*** 
(0.0402) 
-0.8581*** 
(0.0385) 
-0.8499*** 
(0.0392) 
-0.8466*** 
(0.0393) 
-0.8594*** 
(0.0429) 
-0.8368*** 
(0.0444) 
-0.8510*** 
(0.0377) 
-0.8537*** 
(0.0394) 
-0.8520*** 
(0.0392) 
 
Initial_y 2.5207*** 
(0.5370) 
2.8082*** 
(0.5331) 
4.0437*** 
(0.5659) 
2.3624*** 
(0.5150) 
2.3007*** 
(0.5967) 
2.0398*** 
(0.5202) 
2.0506*** 
(0.5233) 
2.3087*** 
(0.5256) 
2.2370*** 
(0.5118) 
2.4935*** 
(0.5085) 
2.1740*** 
(0.5169) 
2.1748*** 
(0.5234) 
Gov_cons   -0.2020*** 
(0.0376) 
-0.2202*** 
(0.0374) 
-0.2266*** 
(0.0365) 
-0.2497*** 
(0.0371) 
-0.2635*** 
(0.0361) 
-0.2398*** 
(0.0372) 
-0.2351*** 
(0.0372) 
-0.2136*** 
(0.0361) 
-0.2309*** 
(0.0371) 
-0.2252*** 
(0.0358) 
-0.2224*** 
(0.0364) 
-0.2462*** 
(0.0401) 
Investment 0.0204*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0174*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0229*** 
(0.0027) 
0.0193*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0177*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0202*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0239*** 
(0.0022) 
0.0215*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0256*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0237*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0238*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0175*** 
(0.0022) 
Population  0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0005 
(0.0003) 
0.0008 
(0.0003) 
0.0006 
(0.0003) 
0.0008** 
(0.0003) 
0.0007 
(0.0003) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0005 
(0.0003) 
0.0008 
(0.0003) 
0.0008 
(0.0003) 
0.0005 
(0.0003) 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
Inst_var -0.3281*** 
(0.1007) 
0.2536** 
(0.1241) 
-0.45526** 
(0.1982) 
0.1557*** 
(0.0119) 
0.2190*** 
(0.0853) 
0.0995*** 
(0.0186) 
-0.4773*** 
(0.1039) 
-0.0096 
(0.1501) 
-0.0976*** 
(0.0251) 
0.3765*** 
(0.1121) 
-0.4978*** 
(0.1543) 
0.1327 
(0.6967) 
constant 0.1090 
(0.4813) 
3.4566*** 
(0.6652) 
3.3075 
(0.7302) 
0.7329 
(3.1435) 
2.1324 
(1.6512) 
0.9361 
(0.8836) 
2.8386 
(0.4813) 
3.3677 
(2.9682) 
0.0986 
(1.8619) 
1.5587 
(0.4813) 
1.5489 
(1.3783) 
1.0955 
(1.0908 
Observation 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 
Instruments 94 94 94 94 0.1090 
(0.4813) 
3.4566*** 
(0.6652) 
3.3075 
(0.7302) 
0.7329 
(3.1435) 
2.1324 
(1.6512) 
0.9361 
(0.8836) 
2.8386 
(0.4813) 
3.3677 
(2.9682) 
 
Hansen test 
(p-value) 
0.71 0.71 0.72 0.69 0.67 0.72 0.73 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.71 0.71 
AR(2) 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.31 0.35 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.31 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.  Standard errors are in parentheses. Institutional variables (inst_var) captured by each regression are as follows: 
Corruption (1), Democratic accountability (2), Military in politics (3), Government stability (4), Internal conflict (5), External conflict (6), Ethnic tension (7), Bureaucratic 
quality (8), Investment profile (9), Socioeconomic conditions (10), Religion in politics (11), Quality of government (12)  
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TABLE 4.  
Two step system GMM (vce robust) estimation using government development expenditures (g_dev) for developing economies 
Dependent variable: growth (gdpg) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Gdpgt-1 -0.8644*** 
(0.0324) 
-0.8673*** 
(0.0347) 
-0.8618*** 
(0.0344) 
-0.8565*** 
(0.0326) 
-0.8579*** 
(0.0319) 
-0.8537*** 
(0.0331) 
-0.8569*** 
(0.0304) 
-0.8600*** 
(0.0338) 
-0.8484*** 
(0.0347) 
-0.8521*** 
(0.0322) 
-0.8644*** 
(0.0321) 
-0.8612*** 
(0.0317) 
Initial_y 2.6939*** 
(0.5370) 
2.7836*** 
(0.4784) 
3.3312*** 
(0.5218) 
2.2004*** 
(0.4736) 
2.0051*** 
(0.5193) 
2.1115*** 
(0.0104) 
2.1826*** 
(0.4676) 
2.4864*** 
(0.4921) 
2.1483*** 
(0.4734) 
2.1664*** 
(0.4807) 
2.4093*** 
(0.4753) 
2.4931*** 
(0.4770) 
Gov_dev   0.0434** 
(0.0176) 
0.0397** 
(0.0182) 
0.0430** 
(0.0176) 
0.0438** 
(0.0186) 
0.0462** 
(0.0187) 
0.0408** 
(0.0189) 
0.0451** 
(0.0182) 
0.0380** 
(0.0187) 
0.0389** 
(0.0187) 
0.0428** 
(0.0183) 
0.0386** 
(0.0182) 
0.0409** 
(0.0188) 
Investment 0.0114** 
(0.0049) 
0.0066** 
(0.0049) 
0.0033 
(0.0050) 
0.0110 
(0.0050) 
0.0198** 
(0.0050) 
0.0104** 
(0.0050) 
0.0102** 
(0.0049) 
0.0114** 
(0.0051) 
0.0098** 
(0.0050) 
0.0093* 
(0.0051) 
0.0130** 
(0.0051) 
0.016** 
(0.0050) 
Population  0.0004 
(0.0003) 
0.0007 
(0.0003) 
0.0011*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0007*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0010 
(0.0003) 
0.0008** 
(0.0003) 
0.0007 
(0.0003) 
0.0007 
(0.0003) 
0.0009 
(0.0003) 
0.0009 
(0.0003) 
0.0007 
(0.0003) 
0.0006 
(0.0003) 
Inst_var -0.2257 
(0.2559) 
0.4532 
(0.5991) 
-0.2842** 
(0.1421) 
0.1388*** 
(0.0694) 
0.1241 
(0.2561) 
-0.1676 
(0.1987) 
-0.7861*** 
(0.0555) 
-0.0982*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.2901*** 
(0.0335) 
-0.6502 
(0.8653) 
-0.2702*** 
(0.0115) 
-0.0943 
(1.1121) 
constant 0.2990 
(0.5455) 
3.1043*** 
(0.8094) 
2.2975*** 
(0.6121) 
2.6298 
(3.9412) 
2.8735* 
(1.5970) 
0.3438 
(0.5383) 
2.4121 
(1.9050) 
2.2154 
(2.6447) 
0.2407 
(1.7008) 
1.3227 
(1.3368) 
1.3794 
(1.2720) 
2.6907 
(2.6413) 
Observation 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 
Instruments 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Hansen test 
(p-value) 
0.61 
 
0.55 0.60 0.61 0.66 0.61 0.62 0.69 0.66 0.65 0.651 0.61 
AR(2) 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.41 0.43 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.37 0.36 0.35 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.  Standard errors are in parentheses. Institutional variables (inst_var) captured by each regression are as follows: 
Corruption (1), Democratic accountability (2), Military in politics (3), Government stability (4), Internal conflict (5), External conflict (6), Ethnic tension (7), Bureaucratic 
quality (8), Investment profile (9), Socioeconomic conditions (10), Religion in politics (11), Quality of government (12) 
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TABLE 5.  
Two step system GMM (vce robust) estimation using government consumption expenditures (g_cons) for developed economies 
Dependent variable: growth (gdpg) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Gdpgt-1 -0.8502*** 
(0.0381) 
-0.8620*** 
(0.0414) 
-0.8668*** 
(0.0417) 
-0.8538*** 
(0.0399) 
-0.8580*** 
(0.0391) 
-0.8493*** 
(0.0393) 
-0.8467*** 
(0.0393) 
-0.8595*** 
(0.0431) 
-0.8391*** 
(0.0451) 
-0.8500*** 
(0.0373) 
-0.8540*** 
(0.0400) 
-0.8504*** 
(0.0391) 
Initial_y 2.5285*** 
(0.5333) 
2.7828*** 
(0.5249) 
3.9350*** 
(0.5659) 
2.2958*** 
(0.5176) 
2.4282*** 
(0.5867) 
2.0397*** 
(0.5208) 
1.9971*** 
(0.5266) 
2.2840*** 
(0.5188) 
2.3096*** 
(0.5050) 
2.4900*** 
(0.5113) 
2.1348*** 
(0.5213) 
2.2660*** 
(0.5233) 
Gov_cons   -2.5285*** 
(0.5333) 
-2.7828*** 
(0.5249) 
-3.9350*** 
(0.5659) 
-2.2958*** 
(0.5176) 
-2.4282*** 
(0.5867) 
-2.0397*** 
(0.5208) 
-1.9971*** 
(0.5266) 
-2.2840*** 
(0.5188) 
-2.3096*** 
(0.5050) 
-2.4900*** 
(0.5113) 
-2.1348*** 
(0.5213) 
-2.2660*** 
(0.5233) 
Investment 0.0160** 
(0.0046) 
0.0034 
(0.0045) 
0.0009 
(0.0046) 
0.0188** 
(0.0046) 
0.0105*** 
(0.0046) 
0.0121** 
(0.0047) 
0.0098** 
(0.0045) 
0.0089* 
(0.0045) 
0.0111** 
(0.0045) 
0.0099** 
(0.0046) 
0.0086* 
(0.0048) 
0.0117** 
(0.0047) 
Population  0.0001 
(0.0005) 
0.0001 
(0.0005) 
0.0001 
(0.0005) 
0.0001 
(0.0005) 
0.0001 
(0.0005) 
0.0001 
(0.0005) 
0.0001 
(0.0005) 
0.0001 
(0.0005) 
0.0001 
(0.0005) 
0.0001 
(0.0005) 
0.0001 
(0.0005) 
0.0001 
(0.0005) 
Inst_var 0.1168** 
(0.0584) 
0.0890 
(0.2165) 
-1.9831 
(2.0044) 
0.0025 
(0.1685) 
0.0225* 
(0.0111) 
-0.1109 
(0.2342) 
0.3177 
(0.4398) 
0.6594** 
(0.3298) 
-0.1665*** 
(0.0630) 
0.1176*** 
(0.0445) 
-0.1183 
(0.6529) 
0.1190*** 
(0.3787) 
constant 0.0148 
(0.0336) 
0.2214*** 
(0.0521) 
0.2265*** 
(0.0609) 
0.1495 
(0.2224) 
0.1126 
(0.1010) 
0.0427 
(0.0518) 
1.5937 
(1.2668) 
0.1252 
(0.1491) 
0.0397 
(0.1414) 
0.7419 
(0.7631) 
0.8978 
(0.8666) 
0.5488 
(0.5156) 
Observation 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
Instruments 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Hansen test 
(p-value) 
0.71 0.73 0.77 0.77 0.65 0.68 0.71 0.72 0.69 0.68 0.66 0.65 
AR(2) 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.11 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.  Standard errors are in parentheses. Institutional variables (inst_var) captured by each regression are as follows: 
Corruption (1), Democratic accountability (2), Military in politics (3), Government stability (4), Internal conflict (5), External conflict (6), Ethnic tension (7), Bureaucratic 
quality (8), Investment profile (9), Socioeconomic conditions (10), Religion in politics (11), Quality of government (12) 
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TABLE 6.  
Two step system GMM (vce robust) estimation using government development expenditures (g_dev) for developed economies 
Dependent variable: growth (gdpg) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Gdpgt-1 0.0460*** 
(0.0177) 
0.0423*** 
(0.0185) 
0.0407*** 
(0.0188) 
0.0598*** 
(0.0173) 
0.0477*** 
(0.0180) 
0.0304*** 
(0.0186) 
0.0325*** 
(0.0191) 
0.0243*** 
(0.0192) 
0.0361*** 
(0.0184) 
0.0385*** 
(0.0178) 
0.0437*** 
(0.0176) 
0.0412*** 
(0.0189) 
Initial_y 2.5015*** 
(0.4701) 
2.4236*** 
(0.4843) 
2.7388*** 
(0.5348) 
2.0731*** 
(0.4532) 
2.4771*** 
(0.5015) 
2.2017*** 
(0.4614) 
2.1920*** 
(0.4601) 
2.6307*** 
(0.4790) 
2.0960*** 
(0.4661) 
2.3281*** 
(0.4592) 
2.1872*** 
(0.4702) 
2.3636*** 
(0.4757) 
Gov_dev   0.2292*** 
(0.0533) 
0.2296*** 
(0.0511) 
0.2406*** 
(0.0235) 
0.2116*** 
(0.0345) 
0.1987*** 
(0.0264) 
0.2046*** 
(0.0288) 
0.2222*** 
(0.0241) 
0.2799*** 
(0.0325) 
0.1955*** 
(0.0273) 
0.1898*** 
(0.0302) 
0.2014*** 
(0.0231) 
0.2717*** 
(0.0202) 
Investment 0.0114** 
(0.0049) 
0.0091* 
(0.0052) 
0.0080 
(0.0053) 
0.0104** 
(0.0048) 
0.0122** 
(0.0048) 
0.0153** 
(0.0049) 
0.0144** 
(0.0049) 
0.0097* 
(0.0050) 
0.0112** 
(0.0047) 
0.0106** 
(0.0048) 
0.0079*** 
(0.0051) 
0.0140*** 
(0.0051) 
Population  0.0005 
(0.0003) 
0.0008 
(0.0003) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0009 
(0.0003) 
0.0009 
(0.0003) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.0006* 
(0.0003) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0007 
(0.0003) 
0.0007 
(0.0003) 
0.0005 
(0.0003) 
Inst_var 0.2896 
(0.5211) 
0.5767** 
(0.2883) 
0.1922 
(0.6117) 
0.2585*** 
(0.1292) 
0.1195** 
(0.0597) 
0.5981** 
(0.2990) 
0.0165 
(0.1129) 
0.2556 
(1.8997) 
-0.2825** 
(0.1412) 
0.1111*** 
(0.0420) 
0.3010** 
(0.1505) 
0.2559*** 
(0.0969) 
constant -5.6204** 
(2.4683) 
-8.1279** 
(3.3174) 
-6.9347** 
(3.2218) 
-4.7235*** 
(1.6203) 
-6.4895*** 
(2.4519) 
-5.6068*** 
(1.8654) 
-7.4860*** 
(2.7052) 
-19.0180 
(13.9052) 
-3.0995*** 
(0.9623) 
-3.5857*** 
(1.3398) 
-6.7729*** 
(2.1461) 
-14.3167*** 
(3.8834) 
Observation 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
Instruments 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Hansen test 
(p-value) 
0.77 0.75 0.79 0.71 0.69 0.68 0.73 0.75 0.77 0.73 0.69 0.70 
AR(2) 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.42 0.33 0.30 0.35 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.40 0.41 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.  Standard errors are in parentheses. Institutional variables (inst_var) captured by each regression are as follows: 
Corruption (1), Democratic accountability (2), Military in politics (3), Government stability (4), Internal conflict (5), External conflict (6), Ethnic tension (7), Bureaucratic 
quality (8), Investment profile (9), Socioeconomic conditions (10), Religion in politics (11), Quality of government (12) 
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Robustness test 
 
TABLE 7. Two step system GMM (vce robust) estimation using government 
consumption expenditures (g_cons) for developing economies 
Dependent variable: growth (gdpg) 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gdpgt-1 -0.8520*** 
(0.0347) 
-0.8750*** 
(0.0368) 
-0.8754*** 
(0.0369) 
-0.8694*** 
(0.0372) 
-0.8663*** 
(0.0349) 
-0.8571*** 
(0.0356) 
Initial_y 4.8161*** 
(1.0895) 
5.8454*** 
(1.0550) 
5.9359*** 
(1.0135) 
4.2221*** 
(1.0253) 
3.3187*** 
(1.1259) 
4.1140*** 
(1.1000) 
Gov_cons   -0.1931*** 
(0.0440) 
-0.2704*** 
(0.0450) 
-0.2983*** 
(0.0435) 
-0.2690*** 
(0.0418) 
-0.2726*** 
(0.0415) 
-0.2290*** 
(0.0426) 
Investment 0.0147** 
(0.0057) 
0.0075 
(0.0058) 
0.0058 
(0.0060) 
0.0087 
(0.0058) 
0.0144** 
(0.0056) 
0.0160*** 
(0.0057) 
Population  -0.0491 
(0.0524) 
-0.0019 
(0.0515) 
-0.0208 
(0.0489) 
-0.0797 
(0.0493) 
-0.1702*** 
(0.0551) 
-0.0831 
(0.0524) 
Inst_var 0.2101** 
(0.1050) 
0.0135*** 
(0.0050) 
0.0198 
(0.3288) 
-0.1123*** 
(0.0425) 
0.0087*** 
(0.0032) 
-0.4376** 
(0.2188) 
constant 5.2451*** 
(0.5974) 
3.7415*** 
(0.6171) 
6.5817*** 
(0.3128) 
6.9417*** 
(0.5516) 
6.2608*** 
(0.3375) 
7.4563*** 
(0.3635) 
Observation 546 546 546 546 546 546 
Instruments 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Hansen test 
(p-value) 
0.67 0.69 0.68 0.71 0.69 0.70 
AR(2) 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.33 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Institutional variables (inst_var) captured by each regression are as follows: Voice & accountability (1), 
Political stability & absence of violence (2), government effectiveness (3), Regulatory quality (4), rule 
of law (5), Control of corruption (6) 
 
 
TABLE 8. Two step system GMM (vce robust) estimation using government 
development expenditures (g_dev) for developing economies 
Dependent variable: growth (gdpg) 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gdpgt-1 -0.8508*** 
(0.0368) 
-0.8470*** 
(0.0389) 
-0.8400*** 
(0.0392) 
-0.8479*** 
(0.0367) 
-0.8400*** 
(0.0354) 
-0.8477*** 
(0.0370) 
Initial_y 3.0429*** 
(0.9807) 
3.2301*** 
(1.0145) 
3.0741*** 
(0.9904) 
2.6220*** 
(0.9615) 
2.6800** 
(1.0301) 
2.9946*** 
(0.9821) 
Gov_dev   0.0488** 
(0.0219) 
0.0318** 
(0.0235) 
0.0359 
(0.0230) 
0.0546** 
(0.0228) 
0.0560** 
(0.0226) 
0.0552** 
(0.0224) 
Investment 0.0143** 
(0.0060) 
0.0081 
(0.0063) 
0.0054 
(0.0065) 
0.0154** 
(0.0061) 
0.0142** 
(0.0061) 
0.0163*** 
(0.0060) 
Population  -0.0976** 
(0.0473) 
-0.0974** 
(0.0478) 
-0.1268*** 
(0.0471) 
-0.1396*** 
(0.0456) 
-0.1527*** 
(0.0497) 
-0.1059** 
(0.0480) 
Inst_var -0.1901 
(0.5442) 
0.1877** 
(0.0938) 
-0.5564*** 
(0.2107) 
-0.1129*** 
(0.0427) 
-0.3265** 
(0.1632) 
-0.2876 
(0.3241) 
constant 0.1465 
(0.4506) 
1.9804*** 
(0.6438) 
0.8205 
(0.7207) 
1.8136 
(2.8303) 
3.1193** 
(1.3357) 
2.4258 
(1.8163) 
Observation 546 546 546 546 546 546 
Instruments 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Hansen test 
(p-value) 
0.65 0.64 0.63 0.66 0.65 0.65 
AR(2) 0.38 0.41 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.35 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Institutional variables (inst_var) captured by each regression are as follows: Voice & accountability (1), 
Political stability & absence of violence (2), government effectiveness (3), Regulatory quality (4), rule 
of law (5), Control of corruption (6) 
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TABLE 9. Two step system GMM (vce robust) estimation using government 
consumption expenditures (g_cons) for developed economies  
Dependent variable: growth (gdpg) 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gdpgt-1 -0.8525*** 
(0.0349) 
-0.8713*** 
(0.0367) 
-0.8715*** 
(0.0371) 
-0.8705*** 
(0.0370) 
-0.8652*** 
(0.0358) 
-0.8574*** 
(0.0358) 
Initial_y 0.8525*** 
(0.0349) 
0.8713*** 
(0.0367) 
0.8715*** 
(0.0371) 
0.8705*** 
(0.0370) 
0.8652*** 
(0.0358) 
0.8574*** 
(0.0358) 
Gov_cons   0.0488** 
(0.0219) 
0.0318** 
(0.0235) 
0.0359 
(0.0230) 
0.0546** 
(0.0228) 
0.0560** 
(0.0226) 
0.0552** 
(0.0224) 
Investment 0.0146** 
(0.0057) 
0.0068 
(0.0058) 
0.0056 
(0.0061) 
0.0091 
(0.0058) 
0.0144** 
(0.0055) 
0.0158*** 
(0.0057) 
Population  -0.0482 
(0.0527) 
-0.0013 
(0.0518) 
-0.0197 
(0.0487) 
-0.0845* 
(0.0508) 
-0.1984*** 
(0.0558) 
-0.0805 
(0.0523) 
Inst_var 0.8776 
(2.8653) 
0.6650 
(1.9961) 
0.6653** 
(0.3326) 
-0.4873*** 
(0.1845) 
0.1109 
(2.3862) 
0.1125* 
(0.0661) 
constant 0.0542* 
(0.0295) 
0.1440*** 
(0.0452) 
0.1363** 
(0.0679) 
0.2714 
(0.2736) 
0.0832 
(0.0890) 
0.0104 
(0.0485) 
Observation 180 180 180 180 180 180 
Instruments 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Hansen test 
(p-value) 
0.41 0.45 0.43 0.41 0.42 0.41 
AR(2) 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.34 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Institutional variables (inst_var) captured by each regression are as follows: Voice & accountability (1), 
Political stability & absence of violence (2), government effectiveness (3), Regulatory quality (4), rule 
of law (5), Control of corruption (6) 
 
TABLE 10. Two step system GMM (vce robust) estimation using government 
development expenditures (g_dev) for developed economies 
Dependent variable: growth (gdpg) 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gdpgt-1 -0.8471*** 
(0.0362) 
-0.8392*** 
(0.0399) 
-0.8300*** 
(0.0389) 
-0.8505*** 
(0.0363) 
-0.8568*** 
(0.0358) 
-0.8540*** 
(0.0376) 
Initial_y 3.0377*** 
(0.9722) 
3.0881*** 
(1.0189) 
2.8135*** 
(1.0042) 
2.3911*** 
(0.9252) 
2.5814** 
(1.0194) 
3.2165*** 
(0.9490) 
Gov_dev   0.0542* 
(0.0295) 
0.1440*** 
(0.0452) 
0.1363** 
(0.0679) 
0.2714 
(0.2736) 
0.0832 
(0.0890) 
0.0104 
(0.0485) 
Investment 0.0143** 
(0.0060) 
0.0100 
(0.0065) 
0.0098 
(0.0066) 
0.0125** 
(0.0060) 
0.0133** 
(0.0059) 
0.0173** 
(0.0059) 
Population  -0.0989** 
(0.1072) 
-0.1098** 
(0.0482) 
-0.1470*** 
(0.0484) 
-0.1307*** 
(0.0439) 
-0.1716*** 
(0.0498) 
-0.0788* 
(0.0467) 
Inst_var 1.2118* 
(0.7170) 
0.6252** 
(0.3126) 
0.1132 
(2.8765) 
-0.1225 
(1.3428) 
0.9870 
(1.9985) 
0.8765 
(1.8251) 
constant 0.0454 
(0.0339) 
0.0468 
(0.0309) 
0.0164 
(0.0254) 
0.2277** 
(0.1057) 
0.2326 
(0.0900) 
0.1995 
(0.1227) 
Observation 180 180 180 180 180 180 
Instruments 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Hansen test 
(p-value) 
0.43 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.44 
AR(2) 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Institutional variables (inst_var) captured by each regression are as follows: Voice & accountability (1), 
Political stability & absence of violence (2), government effectiveness (3), Regulatory quality (4), rule 
of law (5), Control of corruption (6) 
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TABLE 11. Two step system GMM (vce robust) estimation using government consumption expenditures (g_cons) for developing 
economies 
Dependent variable: growth (gdpg) 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Gdpgt-1 -0.9311*** 
(0.0264) 
-0.9295*** 
(0.0261) 
-0.9342*** 
(0.0274) 
-0.9239*** 
(0.0276) 
-0.9245*** 
(0.0264) 
-0.9093*** 
(0.0272) 
-0.9216*** 
(0.0257) 
-0.9320*** 
(0.0247) 
-0.9309*** 
(0.0270) 
-0.9244*** 
(0.0261) 
-0.9368*** 
(0.0261) 
-0.9197*** 
(0.0265) 
Initial_y 1.1537 
(0.6836) 
1.5226*** 
(0.6505) 
2.3802*** 
(0.7008) 
1.9856*** 
(0.6540) 
2.4536*** 
(0.6694) 
2.7599*** 
(0.6826) 
2.4707*** 
(0.6322) 
1.1666* 
(0.6593) 
2.0542** 
(0.6416) 
1.4006* 
(0.6471) 
1.2750** 
(0.6630) 
1.5782** 
(0.6700) 
Gov_cons   0.5561*** 
(0.1274) 
0.5162*** 
(0.1175) 
0.4634*** 
(0.1280) 
0.4759*** 
(0.1337) 
0.4033*** 
(0.1756) 
0.3821*** 
(0.1418) 
0.4011*** 
(0.1311) 
0.6465*** 
(0.2891) 
0.5789*** 
(0.1711) 
0.5437*** 
(0.1345) 
0.4932*** 
(0.1257) 
0.4095*** 
(0.1473) 
Investment 0.0104 
(0.0235) 
0.0052 
(0.0230) 
0.0229 
(0.0221) 
0.0044 
(0.0225) 
0.0075 
(0.0233) 
0.0142 
(0.0228) 
0.0173 
(0.0229) 
0.0149 
(0.0224) 
0.0234 
(0.0222) 
0.0003 
(0.0229) 
0.0131 
(0.0225) 
0.0153 
(0.0228) 
Population  -0.1280** 
(0.3229) 
-0.0745 
(0.3068) 
-0.0292 
(0.2964) 
-0.0830 
(0.2770) 
-0.0625 
(0.3058) 
-0.2316 
(0.3082) 
-0.1356 
(0.3031) 
-0.0297 
(0.3281) 
-0.1511 
(0.3127) 
-0.0023 
(0.2978) 
-0.1757 
(0.3468) 
-0.0015 
(0.3350) 
Inv x gov 0.3755*** 
(0.1196) 
0.5974** 
(0.2529) 
0.3251*** 
(0.1034) 
0.2231** 
(0.1097) 
0.1922 
(0.3873) 
0.1664 
(0.1259) 
0.1599 
(0.1664) 
0.3432 
(0.2636) 
0.4344* 
(0.2509) 
0.4404 
(0.1430) 
0.1316 
(0.1449) 
0.2784** 
(0.1128) 
constant 0.1321** 
(0.0667) 
0.1272** 
(0.0611) 
0.1458*** 
(0.0540) 
0.1499** 
(0.0673) 
0.1245*** 
(0.0601) 
0.2085 
(0.0609) 
0.1287 
(0.0560) 
0.0916 
(0.0597) 
0.1374** 
(0.0590) 
0.1382** 
(0.0549) 
0.1323** 
(0.0634) 
0.1228** 
(0.0571) 
Observation 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 
Instruments 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Hansen test 
(p-value) 
0.61 0.65 0.55 0.57 0.53 0.61 0.66 0.65 0.54 0.53 0.58 0.57 
AR(2) 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.12 
Notes:***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.Standard errors are in parentheses. The interactive terms captured by each regression are defined as follows:  
(1) Corruption  government consumption expenditures (7) Ethnic tension  government consumption expenditures  
(2) Democratic accountability  government consumption expenditures (8) Bureaucratic quality  government consumption expenditures 
(3) Military in politics  government consumption expenditures (9) Investment profile  government consumption expenditures 
(4) Government stability  government consumption expenditures (10) Socioeconomic conditions  government consumption expenditures 
(5) Internal conflict  government consumption expenditures (11) Religion in politics  government consumption expenditures 
(6) External conflict  government consumption expenditures  (12) Quality of government  government consumption expenditures 
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TABLE 12. Two step system GMM (vce robust) estimation using government consumption expenditures (g_dev) for developed 
economies 
Dependent variable: growth (gdpg) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Gdpgt-1 -0.9385*** 
(0.0268) 
-0.9305*** 
(0.0276) 
-0.9310*** 
(0.0282) 
-0.9262*** 
(0.0280) 
-0.9473*** 
(0.0266) 
-0.9284*** 
(0.0272) 
-0.9216*** 
(0.0279) 
-0.9220** 
(0.0268) 
-0.9412*** 
(0.0272) 
-0.9230*** 
(0.0263) 
-0.9335*** 
(0.0275) 
-0.9374*** 
(0.0272) 
Initial_y 0.00001 
(0.0002) 
0.00001 
(0.0002) 
0.00001 
(0.0002) 
0.00001 
(0.0002) 
0.00001 
(0.0002) 
0.00001 
(0.0002) 
0.00001 
(0.0002) 
0.00001 
(0.0002) 
0.00001 
(0.0002) 
0.00001 
(0.0002) 
0.00001 
(0.0002) 
0.00001 
(0.0002) 
Gov_ cons 0.0461*** 
(0.0123) 
0.0495*** 
(0.0115) 
0.0382*** 
(0.0121) 
0.0538*** 
(0.0121) 
0.0509*** 
(0.0128) 
0.0375*** 
(0.0120) 
0.0494*** 
(0.0119) 
0.0434*** 
(0.0121) 
0.0529*** 
(0.0116) 
0.0533*** 
(0.0123) 
0.0485*** 
(0.0120) 
0.0447*** 
(0.0116) 
Investment 0.0023 
(0.0070) 
0.0048 
(0.0071) 
0.0023 
(0.0062) 
0.0054 
(0.0065) 
0.0013 
(0.0045) 
0.0029 
(0.0055) 
0.0008 
(0.0058) 
0.0004 
(0.0091) 
0.0017 
(0..61) 
0.0028 
(0.0053) 
0.0048 
(0.0069) 
0.0067 
(0.0087) 
Population  0.0039 
(0.0044) 
0.0035 
(0.0043) 
0.0015 
(0.0044) 
0.0064 
(0.0044) 
0.0030 
(0.0045) 
0.0046 
(0.0044) 
0.0051 
(0.0043) 
0.0079 
(0.0045) 
0.0023 
(0.0045) 
0.0084* 
(0.0045) 
-0.0085* 
(0.0044) 
0.0073 
(0.0045) 
Inv x gov 0.3795 
(0.4640) 
1.0422* 
(0.5375) 
0.6021 
(0.5561) 
0.2202*** 
(0.0582) 
0.3597* 
(0.2013) 
0.2382** 
(0.1147) 
0.6385 
(0.3891) 
4.2527 
(3.8497) 
0.1536*** 
(0.0536) 
0.2164*** 
(0.0774) 
0.0326 
(0.3229) 
11.0423*** 
(3.8069) 
constant 0.1019* 
(0.0543) 
0.0824* 
(0.0439) 
0.0682 
(0.0477) 
0.1058** 
(0.0535) 
0.0895 
(0.0478) 
0.0747 
(0.0467) 
0.1024** 
(0.0455) 
0.0857** 
(0.0418) 
0.0952** 
(0.0461) 
0.0802* 
(0.0476) 
0.1053* 
(0.0589) 
0.0960** 
(0.0486) 
Observation 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
Instruments 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Hansen test 
(p-value) 
0.61 0.65 0.55 0.57 0.53 0.61 0.66 0.65 0.54 0.53 0.58 0.57 
AR(2) 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.12 
Notes:***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.Standard errors are in parentheses. The interactive terms captured by each regression are defined as follows:  
(1) Corruption  government consumption expenditures (7) Ethnic tension  government consumption expenditures  
(2) Democratic accountability  government consumption expenditures (8) Bureaucratic quality  government consumption expenditures 
(3) Military in politics  government consumption expenditures (9) Investment profile  government consumption expenditures 
(4) Government stability  government consumption expenditures (10) Socioeconomic conditions  government consumption expenditures 
(5) Internal conflict  government consumption expenditures (11) Religion in politics  government consumption expenditures 
(6) External conflict  government consumption expenditures (12) Quality of government  government consumption expenditures 
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5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Government expenditures have undeniably played a pivotal role in enhancing growth.  
The paper re-examines the impact of government expenditure on economic growth.  In 
this paper, we segregated the sample into developing and developed economies and 
government expenditures is categorized into government consumption expenditures 
and government development expenditures.  However, growth impact is conditioned 
upon the efficiency and effectiveness of government expenditures, which is the product 
of good governance and strong institutions. Countries with strong institutional 
environment implement effective policies, which eventually promote growth. In this 
paper, we show that effective institutions come in the form of more stable governments, 
better socioeconomic conditions, superior bureaucratic quality, and prudent law and 
order.   In addition, factors such as minimal internal and external conflicts, corruption, 
ethnic and religious tensions, minimal interference of military in politics also play a 
part in mobilising the government expenditures toward enhancing growth.  
 
The results can be summarized in two main points: (i) government consumption 
expenditures has a negative impact on economic growth for both developed and 
developing economies; (ii) government development expenditures has a growth 
enhancing effect in the long run; and (iii) government consumption expenditures have 
positive effect on economic growth when consumption expenditures is interacted with 
institutional variables.  Results are fairly consistent for both developed and developed 
countries, suggesting homogeneous path for economic growth. In other words, 
economic growth requires similar factors to be effective.  The introduction of 
interaction between government consumption expenditure and institutional variables 
yield positive impact on the economic growth, hence, suggesting that good governance 
promotes efficient use of government funds even in operational expenses which 
eventually promotes economic growth.   
 
It should be noted that results are largely subject to country choice and data span.  
Nevertheless, the results established in this study are sufficient to infer the importance 
of government consumption and development expenditures in promoting economic 
growth. An important policy implication is that the governments should promote strong 
institutions and move consumption expenditures towards development expenditures.  
Corruption, ineffective economic policies, and other institutional discrepancies can 
potentially be corrected if civil society is strong; as the removal of such malaises will 
help to develop an efficient environment for growth.   
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Appendix A: Definition of institutional variables 
 
Government 
stability 
Government ability to carry out policies and stay in office. Higher value 
indicates more stable government. 
Socioeconomic 
condition 
Socio economic pressures at work in society that might restrain government 
action or elevate social dissatisfaction and hence destabilize political regimes. 
A higher value indicates better socioeconomic conditions. 
Investment profile Assesses factors related to risk of investment that are not covered by financial 
and economic risk components such as contract viability, expropriation, profits 
repatriation, or payment delay. A higher value indicates less investment 
distortions. 
Internal conflict Measures political violence within the country and the actual and potential 
impact it has on governance. For example civil war, terrorism, political 
violence, or civil disorder. A higher value indicates less internal conflict. 
Internal conflict is absent if the value is 1. 
External conflict Risk to the incumbent government from foreign action for example diplomatic 
pressures, withholding aid or trade sanctions (non-violent external pressure), or 
cross-border conflicts such as war (violent external pressure).A higher value 
indicates less external conflict. 
Corruption Assesses the level of corruption. A higher value indicates less corruption. 
Military in politics Captures the influence of military groups in politics. This signals the fact that 
the government is not able to function effectively, thus indicating an 
unfavourable business environment. A higher value indicates less or minimal 
military interference in politics. 
Religious tensions Captures religious tension emerging from the domination of society or 
governance of a single religious group. For example, movements to replace 
civil with religious law or to exclude other religions from the political and 
social process. A higher value indicates minimal religious tensions. 
Law & order Characterizes the strength and impartiality of the legal system. A higher value 
indicates a stronger legal system. 
Ethnic tensions Represents the degree of tensions amongst ethnic groups attributable to racial, 
nationality and language division. A higher value indicates less ethnic tensions. 
Democratic 
accountability 
Accounts for democratic accountability of the government via responsiveness 
to its citizens, civil liberties, and political rights of the citizens. A higher value 
indicates better democratic accountability. 
Bureaucracy Denotes institutional strength and quality of bureaucracy. For example the 
ability to reduce policy revision whenever political figures change. A higher 
value indicates better quality bureaucracy. 
Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Political Risk Group (PRS) 
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Appendix B: 
 
TABLE 13. Fixed effect estimation using government consumption expenditures (g_cons) for developed economies 
Dependent variable: growth (gdpg) 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Gdpgt-1 -0.0519** 
(0.0208) 
-0.4761** 
(0.0221) 
-0.0912*** 
(0.0216) 
-0.1149*** 
(0.0262) 
-0.1038*** 
(0.0209) 
-0.1057*** 
(0.0195) 
-0.0937*** 
(0.0206) 
-0.060*** 
(0.0219) 
-0.0883*** 
(0.0206) 
-0.0208*** 
(0.0206) 
-0.0669*** 
(0.0217) 
-0.1026*** 
(0.0207) 
Initial_y -0.6754 
(0.5343) 
-0.4775 
(0.5484) 
1.311** 
(0.5955) 
2.3468*** 
(0.5251) 
-0.5564 
(0.5746) 
1.5749*** 
(0.5821) 
0.9246* 
(0.4736) 
1.3592*** 
(0.4768) 
1.1056** 
(0.4456) 
0.9623** 
(0.4639) 
1.0625** 
(0.4727) 
1.3985*** 
(0.4827) 
Gov_cons   -0.6417*** 
(0.0495) 
-0.6645*** 
(0.0434) 
-0.7177*** 
(0.0531) 
-0.6443*** 
(0.0895) 
-0.8501*** 
(0.2001) 
-0.7694*** 
(0.2289) 
-0.6783*** 
(0.0430) 
-1.0029*** 
(0.2284) 
-0.7182*** 
(0.0966) 
-0.6581*** 
(0.0838) 
-0.6844*** 
(0.0423) 
-0.6646*** 
(0.0732) 
Investment 0.01505*** 
(0.0042) 
0.0054 
(0.044) 
0.0101** 
(0.0048) 
0.0194*** 
(0.0048) 
0.0213*** 
(0.0049) 
0.0195*** 
(0.0049) 
0.0109*** 
(0.0043) 
0.0088** 
(0.0042) 
-0.0141*** 
(0.0042) 
0.0143*** 
(0.0043) 
0.0128*** 
(0.0043) 
0.0151*** 
(0.0043) 
Population  0.5239*** 
(0.1072) 
0.3263*** 
(0.1127) 
0.3088*** 
(0.1127) 
0.2618** 
(0.1125) 
0.3323** 
(0.1326) 
0.2668** 
(0.1110) 
0.2008* 
(0.1044) 
0.3140*** 
(0.1019) 
0.1305 
(0.1018) 
0.2163** 
(0.1023) 
0.3332*** 
(0.1035) 
0.1867* 
(0.1037) 
Inst_var 3.2175*** 
(0.7199) 
2.986** 
(1.1573) 
5.3439*** 
(0.9484) 
1.8753** 
(0.8496) 
2.7833** 
(1.1657) 
3.6355*** 
(1.1269) 
2.3173 
(1.9156) 
1.1816 
(1.7298) 
5.4123** 
(2.3766) 
7.2578*** 
(2.0903) 
4.0345** 
(1.6497) 
6.1160*** 
(2.0663) 
constant 2.3066*** 
(0.5470) 
2.8962*** 
(0.8185) 
3.0615*** 
(0.6406) 
0.6133 
(0.6847) 
1.6816* 
(0.8669) 
0.7636 
(0.5663) 
0.3875 
(0.4159) 
1.1415** 
(0.4525) 
0.9775*** 
(0.3721) 
1.0388** 
(0.4521) 
0.6342 
(0.4143) 
0.4167 
(0.3980) 
Observation 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
Wald (2) 27.31 44.35 15.22 56.51 32.57 16.99 15.88 23.25 44.55 32.89 33.24 23.88 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.  Standard errors are in parentheses. Institutional variables (inst_var) captured by each regression are as follows: 
Corruption (1), Democratic accountability (2), Military in politics (3), Government stability (4), Internal conflict (5), External conflict (6), Ethnic tension (7), Bureaucratic 
quality (8), Investment profile (9), Socioeconomic conditions (10), Religion in politics (11), Quality of government (12) 
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TABLE 14. Fixed effect estimation using government development expenditures (g_dev) for developed economies 
Dependent variable: growth (gdpg) 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Gdpgt-1 -0.9417*** 
(0.2698) 
-0.9056*** 
(0.0274) 
-0.9578*** 
(0.0278) 
-0.9374*** 
(0.0287) 
-0.9249*** 
(0.0264) 
-0.9465*** 
(0.0258) 
-0.9102*** 
(0.0272) 
-0.9138*** 
(0.0276) 
-0.9149*** 
(0.0284) 
-0.9145*** 
(0.0271) 
-0.9103*** 
(0.0261) 
-0.9079*** 
(0.0271) 
Initial_y -1.3165*** 
(0.4928_ 
-1.6748*** 
(0.4405) 
-1.3575** 
(0.5407) 
-2.8344*** 
(0.4730) 
-0.3548 
(0.5265) 
-1.9637*** 
(0.5424) 
-1.3238*** 
(0.4395) 
-1.7583*** 
(0.4361) 
-1.7165*** 
(0.4239) 
-1.4496*** 
(0.4504) 
-1.6754*** 
(0.4391) 
-1.7067*** 
(0.4473) 
Gov_dev   0.0481*** 
(0.0125) 
0.0694*** 
(0.0113) 
0.0530*** 
(0.0124) 
0.0677*** 
(0.0127) 
0.0369*** 
(0.0132) 
0.0525*** 
(0.0123) 
0.0615*** 
(0.0116) 
0.0589*** 
(0.0114) 
0.0630*** 
(0.0111) 
0.0565*** 
(0.0117) 
0.0572*** 
(0.0119) 
0.0601*** 
(0.0115) 
Investment 0.0176*** 
(0.0040) 
0.0105*** 
(0.0037) 
0.0111** 
(0.0044) 
0.0145*** 
(0.0044) 
0.0158*** 
(0.0044) 
0.0162*** 
(0.0046) 
0.0082** 
(0.0039) 
0.0088** 
(0.0038) 
0.0122*** 
(0.0039) 
0.1176*** 
(0.0040) 
0.0123*** 
(0.0040) 
0.1253*** 
(0.0039) 
Population  0.41662*** 
(0.1128) 
0.1328 
(0.1070) 
0.2159* 
(0.1177) 
0.1856* 
(0.1123) 
0.3575*** 
(0.1299) 
0.2658** 
(0.1176) 
0.1552 
(0.1077) 
0.2144** 
(0.1056) 
0.1118 
(0.1079) 
0.1477 
(0.1087) 
0.2577** 
(0.1073) 
0.1611 
(0.1086) 
Inst_var 2.6208*** 
(0.7005) 
8.1667*** 
(2.8290) 
4.0390*** 
(0.8669) 
1.6339** 
(0.7612) 
4.1054* 
(2.2657) 
2.0525 
(1.3096) 
2.4581 
(1.7862) 
2.2487 
(3.2004) 
5.2487** 
(2.6503) 
6.8221*** 
(1.8999) 
4.9301*** 
(1.7119) 
4.2458** 
(1.8869) 
constant 1.6057*** 
(0.5110) 
-0.7760 
(0.4926) 
1.8418*** 
(0.6091) 
0.0209 
(0.6103) 
0.5559 
(0.7540) 
0.0174 
(0.5661) 
0.0561 
(0.3785) 
1.2332*** 
(0.3868) 
1.0063*** 
(0.3343) 
1.6316*** 
(0.4084) 
1.1662*** 
(0.3574) 
0.0475 
(0.3691) 
Observation 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
Wald (2) 55.42 23.67 66.22 43.86 33.57 51.25 29.76 33.69 50.11 42.60 45.39 47.65 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.  Standard errors are in parentheses. Institutional variables (inst_var) captured by each regression are as follows: 
Corruption (1), Democratic accountability (2), Military in politics (3), Government stability (4), Internal conflict (5), External conflict (6), Ethnic tension (7), Bureaucratic 
quality (8), Investment profile (9), Socioeconomic conditions (10), Religion in politics (11), Quality of government (12) 
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APPENDIX C: 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Variable Observations Mean Std dev Minimum Maximum 
g 1867 4.24 4.05 -9.53 33.99 
gov 1869 14.88 6.09 3.22 76.22 
gcf 1858 21.74 7.23 -2.42 54.48 
initial 1873 4.66 0.76 2.95 7.03 
open 1863 76.72 53.17 76.72 562.06 
pop 1871 1.98 1.20 -2.96 11.18 
inf 1805 6.94 5.58 -3.20 37.38 
hcap 1876 67.70 64.05 2.8 334.5 
fdi 1841 3.05 4.40 -9.87 51.89 
gstab 1863 0.62 0.18 0.1 1 
socio 1862 0.45 0.16 0.08 0.92 
inv 1862 0.59 0.19 0.1 1 
intcon 1862 0.69 0.20 0.1 1 
cor 1862 0.47 0.18 0.1 1 
dem 1862 0.60 0.27 0.1 1 
bur 1862 0.51 0.26 0.1 1 
extcon 1862 0.79 0.17 0.16 1 
mil 1861 0.55 0.27 0.1 1 
law 1857 0.55 0.21 0.07 1 
ethnic 1847 0.63 0.23 0.01 1 
relig 1857 0.07 0.23 0.01 1 
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CORRELATION MATRIX 
 g gov gcf initial open pop inf hcap fdi 
g  1.000         
gov -0.1077  1.0000        
gcf  0.2761  0.0738  1.0000       
initial  0.1205 -0.0402  0.2634  1.0000      
open  0.0834  0.1462  0.2728 -0.1396  1.0000     
pop  0.0449  0.0102 -0.1186 -0.2865 -0.0229  1.0000    
inf  0.00313 -0.1274 -0.0343 -0.0125 -0.2315  0.0151  1.0000   
hcap -0.0320 -0.2045 -0.3744 -0.3925 -0.3557  0.4115  0.1556  1.0000  
fdi  0.0933  0.0225  0.1750 -0.0552  0.4824 -0.1280 -0.0600 -0.1693  1.00000 
 
 
CORRELATION MATRIX 
 
 g gstab socio inv intcon cor dem bur extcon mil law ethnic relig 
g  1.0000             
gstab  0.1220  1.0000            
socio  0.0808  0.1047  1.0000           
inv  0.0811  0.5481  0.4099  1.0000          
intcon  0.0753  0.4289  0.3299  0.4404  1.0000         
corr -0.0478 -0.0281  0.3683  0.0865  0.2804  1.0000        
dem -0.0676  0.0210  0.0346  0.2224  0.2131  0.3385  1.0000       
bur  0.0030  0.1425  0.5064  0.3638  0.3159  0.5089  0.2558  1.0000      
extcon  0.0168  0.3253  0.1453  0.3314  0.5622  0.1428  0.2442  0.1796  1.0000     
mil -0.0346  0.1051  0.4251  0.4205  0.5200  0.4052  0.3128  0.5136  0.3587  1.0000    
law  0.0958  0.3280  0.4732  0.3787  0.6226  0.4704  0.1302  0.4641  0.3180  0.4490  1.0000   
ethnic  0.0015  0.2406  0.2582  0.2374  0.5282  0.2665  0.1023  0.1879  0.3013  0.3504  0.4169  1.0000   
relig -0.0217  0.0553  0.1322  0.1527  0.3919  0.2930  0.1637  0.0426  0.2752  0.3309  0.1864  0.4028  1.0000 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Selected literature: Economic growth – government expenditures nexus 
Author(s) Countries/Sample Method Result 
Landau (1983) 96 Developed countries OLS Negative 
Ram (1986) 115 countries OLS Positive 
Kormendi & Meguire 
(1986) 
47 countries OLS Positive 
Engen & Skinner 
(1992) 
107 countries 2SLS Negative 
Lin (1994) 20 developed & 42 developing 
countries 
OLS 
2SLS 
3SLS 
Positive 
Hsieh & Lai (1994) G7 
(1970 -1987) 
VAR No relationship 
Hansson & 
Henrekson(1994) 
14 OECD & 14 developed countries 
(1970 – 1987) 
OLS Negative 
Cashin (1995) 23 developed countries 
(1971 – 1988) 
OLS Positive 
Gwartney et al. 
(1998) 
23 OECD countries & 5 rapidly 
developing countries 
Statistical  
inference 
Negative  
Folster & Henrekson 
(2001) 
23 OECD countries OLS Negative 
Dar &Amir Khalkhali 
(2002) 
19 OECD countries Random  
coefficient model 
Negative 
Knowles & Garces-
Ozanne (2003) 
Asian countries 
(1960 – 1985) 
OLS Negative 
Javid et al. (2009) Pakistan 
(1971 – 2008) 
VAR Negative 
Li (2009) G7 
(1959 – 2005) 
Quantile  
Regression, 
LAD & OLS 
Results differ according 
to method and proxy 
used 
Afonso & Furceri 
(2010) 
29 OECD countries & EU15 
(1970-2004) 
Panel Data Negative 
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Butkiewwicz & 
Yanikkaya (2011) 
Develop & developing countries 
(1970 – 2004) 
Panel Data 
 
Negative 
Ravn et al. (2012) US, UK, Canada & Australia 
(1975 – 2005) 
PanelSVAR Positive 
Agnello et al (2013) 132 countries 
(1960 – 2008) 
Panel Data Positive 
Granado et al. (2013) 150 countries 
(1987 – 2007) 
FE, FE-IV, 
system GMM 
Procyclical 
Hamdi & Sbia (2013) Bahrain 
(1960 – 2010) 
VECM Positive  
Dzhumashev (2014) Kenya (low), Turkey (middle) & UK 
(high income) 
Calibration Negative 
(corruption) 
 
